State v. Hayes
Case # A148649
Full Text of Opinion: http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A148649.pdf
Police Officers came to Defendant Hayes’ house one evening after they pulled over a man named Charlan whose car contained five pounds of marijuana and five pounds of hashish. Charlan claimed that he was going to deliver the drugs to Hayes in exchange for $20,000. The Officers got Charlan to call another man, Alderete, in an attempt to get either Alderete or Hayes to come get the drugs in public. After Alderete told Charlan to bring the drugs to Hayes’ house, the Officers convinced Charlan to falsely tell Alderete that his car had broken down at a mall. Alderete came to the mall driving a car registered to Hayes and carrying $200. When Charlan indicated the drugs were in the trunk, both men walked to the trunk. At that point, Officers made contact with Alderete and took him with them to Hayes’ house.
The Officers, who knew Hayes had a permit to grow marijuana under the OMMA, asked Hayes for permission to search the premises. Hayes responded that he wanted to speak to an attorney about whether to consent. One of the Officers told Hayes that he didn’t have to consent, but if consent was not forthcoming then he would obtain a search warrant. Hayes and the Officers had about a 20 minute conversation, during which time the Officers seized Hayes’ cell phone and read him his Miranda rights. Hayes eventually consented to a search and was ultimately charged with unlawful Manufacture of Marijuana, unlawful Delivery of Marijuana, unlawful Possession of Marijuana, and Criminal Forfeiture based on the evidence found. Hayes now appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
Hayes first contends that his consent was not voluntary because the Officers did not honor his request to speak with an attorney. The Court of Appeals notes that the trial court implicitly and explicitly found that, after Hayes said he wanted to speak with an attorney, he and the Officers “engaged in low key and amiable conversation” and that “[t]he conversation did not include any further questioning of [Hayes].” The Court goes on to note that evidence on the record supports this finding. Hayes’ argument is therefore unavailing because it is inconsistent with the trial court’s findings, which are supported by the record.
Hayes next argues that his consent was not voluntary because the Officers illegally seized him before he consented by stopping him without reasonable suspicion. The Court of Appeals notes that the trial court concluded that the Officer’s seizure of Hayes’ cell phone converted the encounter into a stop. The Court goes on to explain that the Officers did have reasonable suspicion that Hayes was involved in the purchase of drugs at the time they made the stop. The reasonable suspicion was derived from the Officers’ encounters with Charlan and Alderete, both men’s statements implicating Hayes, Hayes’ connection to Alderete, and the fact that Alderete drove Hayes’ car to the mall. Because the Officers’ had reasonable suspicion, Hayes’ consent was not involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Hayes’ motion to suppress, and the decision is affirmed.