State v. Kirkland
Case # A153365
Full Text of Opinion: http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A153365.pdf
Defendant Kirkland stole several pieces of jewelry from the victim’s dresser and then a sold one of those pieces of jewelry at a pawnshop. Police officers eventually traced that particular piece of stolen jewelry to Kirkland, and he was arrested. The victim reported that, in addition to the pawned item (which was an opal necklace), there was an additional $1,000 worth of missing jewelry unaccounted for. The victim’s insurer paid her $1,000 for the loss. Kirkland was charged with first-degree theft, and he pled guilty to that charge. Kirkland admitted that he had stolen jewelry from the victim, but he could not remember to whom he had sold the other pieces. At the restitution hearing, the trial court ordered Kirkland to pay the victim $1,405 in restitution for all of the jewelry that the victim had reported missing in addition to the necklace that had been pawned. Kirkland objected to the restitution amount then, and he renews his objection on appeal. Specifically, he argues that because he was only convicted of criminal activity relating to the stolen necklace, he should be held liable only for that restitution amount.
In upholding the full restitution amount, the Court of Appeals notes that ORS 137.106 authorizes a trial court to order restitution “[w]hen a person is convicted of a crime * * * that has resulted in economic damages[.]” A court may not, however, order a defendant “to pay restitution for pecuniary damages arising out of criminal activity for which he was not convicted or which he did not admit having committed.” State v. Seggerman, 167 Or App 140, 145, 3 P3d 168 (2000).
Here, Kirkland’s selling of the victim’s stolen jewelry caused economic damages. Kirkland told police he took the jewelry from the victim’s dresser and that he sold it. In addition, the victim testified about what had been taken, and the State submitted documents from the victim’s insurer listing the missing items and their value. Furthermore, the indictment charged Kirkland with “theft of jewelry, the property of [the victim], by selling the property, defendant knowing that the property was the subject of theft.” Thus, the indictment was not limited to just the necklace. Nor did Kirkland limit his guilty plea to just the necklace. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals concludes that the trial court was authorized to take into account all of the missing jewelry when it calculated the amount of damages. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.